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Teleological Dispositions
 Introduction
Some things are disposed to break when struck. Some things are disposed to bend when
stressed. Some things are disposed to dissolve in water. ings have dispositions.
But dispositions need not manifest. A vase disposed to break when struck may meet
its end by melting rather than breaking. A rod disposed to bend when stressed might
succumb to rust without ever bending. And a chunk of salt disposed to dissolve in water
may be used up while making hydrochloric acid.
ese aremundane observations. Reﬂecting on them, however, leads to two important
intuitions about dispositions. e ﬁrst is that dispositions have some kind of directedness.
e second is that dispositions have some kind of connection with conditionals.
Consider the vase that meets its end by melting rather than breaking. e vase doesn’t
break. Yet it seems that in virtue of being disposed to break when struck, the vase is in a
state that is in some sense directed at a state-of-aﬀairs in which the vase breaks. Likewise,
even though the wire never bends, it seems that in virtue of being disposed to bend when
stressed, the wire is in a state that is in some sense directed at a state-of-aﬀairs in which the
wire bends. Generalizing, the idea is that something with a disposition is in a state that
is in some sense directed at a manifestation of the disposition. Put simply: a disposition
need not manifest but it is in some sense directed at manifesting.
I’ve characterized the directedness intuition as one that needs an explanation. What
needs to be explained the sense in which dispositions are directed at manifesting. Keeping
this in mind, let’s turn to the intuition that dispositions have some kind of connection to
conditionals.
What if the vase had been suitably struck instead of being placed in the furnace? Pre-
sumably, it would have broke and so its disposition to break when struck would have
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manifested. Likewise, what if the wire had been suitably stressed before corroding? Pre-
sumably, it would have bent and so its disposition to bend when stressed would have
manifested. Generalizing, it seems that while a disposition need not manifest, it nonethe-
less would manifest if certain conditions were to obtain. ere thus appears to be some
kind of connection between dispositions and conditionals.
Suppose the connection between dispositions and conditions is a strong connection.
In particular, suppose that we have an informative and counterexample free conditional
analysis of dispositions. en perhaps we could explain the directedness intuition: the
sense in which a disposition is directed at manifesting is that the disposition would man-
ifest if conditions C were to obtain (where conditions C are speciﬁed by the given con-
ditional analysis).
Orthodoxy would have it that the correct account of dispositions rests on a condi-
tional analysis of dispositions and so such an explanation of the directedness intuition is
the right explanation. I argue otherwise. In particular, I argue for a teleological account
of dispositions. According to this account of dispositions, the connection between dispo-
sitions and conditionals is explained in terms of the directedness of dispositions and the
directedness of dispositions is a teleological directedness.
We begin by undermining orthodoxy. Following Molnar () and Fara (), I be-
lieve the project of analyzing dispositions in terms of conditionals is a lost cause. But
the purpose of our overview of conditional analyses is not to establish such a strong
conclusion. e purpose is rather to motivate a turn towards a teleological account of
dispositions.
 Conditional analyses
. e simple conditional analysis
Our starting point is the so-called simple conditional analysis of dispositions. e basic
idea behind this analysis is that every disposition has a stimulus condition, and if that
stimulus condition were to obtain, the disposition would manifest. More explicitly, the
proposal is this:
(SCA) Necessarily: x is disposed toM when C iﬀ x wouldM if C were the case.¹
¹See Ryle (), Goodman (), and ine ().
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For example, if (SCA) is correct, a vase is disposed to break when struck just in case the
vase would break if it were struck.
(SCA) is obviously compatible with the observation that a disposition need not mani-
fest: if the vase is never struck, its disposition to break when struck never manifests. But
(SCA) has some problems. We’ll mention two of the most notorious.
First, there is the problem of ﬁnks. e problem here is that the stimulus condition for
a disposition may also be a condition for losing or acquiring the disposition. e classic
example is C. B. Martin’s elecro-ﬁnk.² It’s connected to a wire that is not disposed to
conduct electricity when touched by a conductor. However, the ﬁnk ensures that if the
wire were to be touched by a conductor, the wire would acquire the disposition. us,
while the wire is not disposed to conduct electricity when touched by a conductor, it
would conduct electricity if it were touched by a conductor.
Martin also provides an example going the other way. Suppose the elecro-ﬁnk has
a reverse cycle. On reverse cycle, the electro-ﬁnk ensures that any wire connected to it
that is disposed to conduct electricity when touched by a conductor loses this disposition
when it is touched by a conductor. Consider such a wire. While the wire is disposed to
conduct electricity when touched by a conductor, it would not conduct electricity if it
were touched by a conductor. On the contrary, if it were touched by a conductor, it would
lose this disposition. So, we have counterexamples to (SCA) in both directions.
Second, there is the problem of masks. A mask is something that prevents a disposition
frommanifesting when the stimulus condition obtains, and it does sowithout taking away
the disposition.³ A standard example involves an antidote for a poison.⁴ e poison is
disposed to kill when ingested. But when ingested, the poison takes some time to do its
work. During that time, if youwere to take the antidote, youwould be saved. e antidote,
however, does not remove the poison’s disposition. It simply prevents the poison from
doing any more damage. Put it this way: even though the poison is killing you, it need not
kill you. You could take the antidote. So, there are situations where the poison wouldn’t
kill if it were ingested even though the poison is disposed to kill when ingested. We have
another counterexample to (SCA).⁵
²See Martin ().
³Masks owe their name to Johnston ().
⁴is example is due to Bird ().
⁵Choi () denies that (SCA) is subject to counterexample from ﬁnks and masks. Somehow, the right-
hand side of the relevant instance of (SCA) is such that the possibility of ﬁnks and masks doesn’t arise. Like
many others, I’m not convinced. One reason why I’m not convinced is that if Choi is right, it’s hard to see
why so many have had the intuition that (SCA) is subject to counterexample by situations involving ﬁnks
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. Appealing to the exclusion of external interference
One response to situations involving ﬁnks and masks is that they involve some kind of
external interference.⁶ In the case of ﬁnks, some kind of external interference causes
an object to acquire or lose the relevant disposition when the stimulus condition for the
disposition obtains. In the case of masks, some kind of external interference prevents the
manifestation of a disposition from obtaining even when disposition’s stimulus condition
obtains and the disposition remains.
Perhaps, then, we can avoid the problem of ﬁnks and the problem of masks by appeal-
ing to a clause which excludes external interference.
(ECA) Necessarily: x is disposed to M when C iﬀ x would M if C were the case and
nothing external were to interfere.
(ECA) should only be seen as a ﬁrst aempt. For it raises the following question: nothing
external to what interferes with what? More needs to be said.
I’m going to aempt to ﬁll in the details. We’ll begin with a conditional analysis of
dispositions inspired by Lewis ().
(LCA) Necessarily: x is disposed to M when C iﬀ x has some intrinsic property I in
virtue of which: if C were the case and x were to retain I , x wouldM .
One might ask: why the appeal to intrinsic properties? Lewis answers, in eﬀect, by claim-
ing that dispositions are intrinsic properties of their bearers.⁷ is claim is controversial.
Some have argued that some dispositions are extrinsic properties.⁸ But we need not con-
cern ourselves with whether dispositions are intrinsic properties. More important for
present purposes is that the appeal to intrinsic properties seems to solve the problem of
ﬁnks.
Consider once again the wire connected to the electric-ﬁnk that is not disposed to
conduct electricity when touched by a conductor. is wire doesn’t have an intrinsic
property I in virtue of which the wire would conduct electricity if it were touched by a
conductor and retain I . e wire does have such an extrinsic property: namely, being
connected to the electro-ﬁnk. And, sure enough, if the wire were touched by a conductor,
the electro-ﬁnk would make the wire acquire such a intrinsic property. But this is neither
and masks.
⁶See Johnston ().
⁷See Lewis (, p. ).
⁸See McKitrick ().
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here nor there as far as (LCA) is concerned. It correctly predicts that, in this scenario, the
wire is not disposed to conduct electricity when touched by a conductor.
e scenario involving the electro-ﬁnk running on reverse cycle is handled in a similar
manner. In this case, the electro-ﬁnk makes the wire, when touched by a conductor, lose
some intrinsic property, and consequently lose the disposition to conduct electricity when
touched by a conductor. But what would happen if the wire were touched by a conductor
and it were to retain this intrinsic property? It would conduct electricity, so it seems. So,
(LCA) correctly predicts that the wire is disposed to conduct electricity when touched by
a conductor.
Masks, however, are still a problem. You ingest the poison but take the antidote. e
antidote doesn’t remove the poison’s disposition to kill when ingested. It just prevents the
manifestation of the disposition from obtaining. So, the poison retains whatever intrinsic
property grounds its disposition. (LCA) thus predicts that you die. But you don’t, thanks
to the antidote.
ere is a modiﬁcation of (LCA) that avoids this counterexample. Consider (LCA+)
and one of its instances.
(LCA+) Necessarily: x is disposed to M when C iﬀ x has some intrinsic property I in
virtue of which: ifC were to obtain and xwere to retain I , there would be a process
p such that if nothing external to pwere to interfere with p, xwouldM (as a result).
() Necessarily: the poison is disposed to kill when ingested iﬀ: the poison has some
intrinsic property I in virtue of which: if it were to ingested by x and it were to
retain I , there would be a process p such that if nothing external to p were to
interfere with p, the poison would kill x (as a result).
Now take some time t aer you have ingested the poison but before you have taken the
antidote. e poison is causing damage to your organs at t. Let this process be p. e
question, then, is whether p is such that if nothing external to it were to interfere with it,
the poison would kill you as a result. It seems plausible, at least from the rather limited
description of the case, that p is such a process. Shortly aer t, you take the antidote.
In doing so, another process obtains, one which is external to p. is process prevents p
from developing into one in which the poison kills you as a result. But if it weren’t for
this external interference, p would have developed into such a process. us, () correctly
predicts that the poison is disposed to kill you when you ingest it.
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(LCA+) is the best I can do to spell out the “provided nothing external interferes”
response. But my best is not good enough: the analysis is subject to counterexample.
Our counterexample a variant of one due to Manley andWasserman ().⁹ Suppose
there is a concrete block that withstands any damage done to it by a sledgehammer unless
it is hit in just the right spot with just the right amount of force. Furthermore, it is nearly
impossible to hit the block in this spot with the right amount of force. But if the block is
hit in the right spot with the right amount of force, it shaers as a result. e block has
an Achilles’ heel. Now while this block could shaer from being stuck, it seems that we
would quite rightly think that it is not disposed to shaer when struck.
Now suppose that, due to some freak occurrence and despite no intrinsic change to
the block, conditions are temporarily just right for the block to be hit in the just the right
spot with just the right amount of force, provided someone is around to strike the block.
For the next two seconds, if anyone were to pick up a sledgehammer and strike the block,
the block would be struck in just the right spot with the right amount of force. But no
one is around to strike the block.
While conditions did momentarily obtain such that the block would shaer if it were
struck, these conditions did not thereby render the block disposed to shaer when struck.
We thus have a counterexample to (LCA+). During the above described two second in-
terval, it is not the case that the block is disposed to shaer when struck. However, it is
the case that the block has some intrinsic property (its Achilles’ heel) in virtue of which,
if the block were struck and retain this property, there would be a event such that if this
event were to continue without interruption, the block would shaer (as a result). So my
best is not good enough.¹⁰
⁹Manley and Wasserman () use their example to refute conditional analyses that reply to the prob-
lem of ﬁnks and the problem of masks by appealing to hyper-speciﬁc stimulus conditions. e basic idea
behind such analyses is that when we say, for example, “the vase is disposed to break when struck,” the
disposition ascribed is not simply being disposed to break when struck but being disposed to break when
stuck in some hyper-speciﬁc way. (is seems to be Lewis’s response to the problem of masks: see Lewis
, p. .) I don’t consider “hyper-speciﬁc” conditional analyses here, mainly because they seem to be ad
hoc responses to the problems of ﬁnks and masks. Manley and Wasserman oﬀer a more substantive (and
conclusive) argument against hyper-speciﬁc conditional analyses.
¹⁰Contessa () oﬀers an “interference free” conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions. But his
best is no beer than mine: it is subject to counterexample as well. Bypassing the details of his analysis, it
suﬃces to note that his analysis predicts that if x is intrinsically disposed toM when C and y is something
that interferes with x’s being intrinsically disposed toM when C , then it’s not the case that x wouldM if
C were the case. But this prediction is incorrect. Here’s why.
Suppose x is intrinsically disposed to break into pieces when struck. Further suppose that y is something
that interferes with x’s disposition in the following way. If x were stuck, a process P of x breaking into
pieces would begin as a result. However, this process P wouldn’t culminate because some state-of-aﬀairs S
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. Appealing to normal conditions
One might worry that the counterexamples we’ve consider so far invoke situations that
are in some sense abnormal or atypical. Certainly, the situation involving the block with
an Achilles’ heel is not a normal situation. Likewise, it seems that wires, whether or not
they are disposed to conduct electricity when touched by a conductor, are not normally
connected to some sort of electro-ﬁnk. And in the situation where you ingest the poison
but take the antidote, it would be natural to say something like “e poison didn’t kill
you, but normally it would have.”
Perhaps, then, we should consider a conditional analysis of dispositions that explicitly
appeals to normality.
(NCA) Necessarily: x is disposed to M when C iﬀ in normal conditions, x would M if
C were the case.
Supposing that situations involving ﬁnks, masks, and Achilles’ heels are not normal situ-
ations, the hope is that (NCA) allows us to properly ignore these situations.
But in what sense are such situations abnormal? Fara () points out there need not
be anything bizarre about a mask:
Dispositions of objects are being masked all the time. I’m disposed to go
to sleep when I’m tired; but this disposition is sometimes masked by too
much street noise. Cylinders of rubber are disposed to roll when placed on
an inclined plane; but this disposition can be masked by applying a car’s
brakes…[T]he masking of dispositions is such a humdrum occurrence that
any adequate account of [dispositions] must accommodate it.¹¹
Similar remarks apply to Achilles’ heels: they are so common that any adequate account
of dispositions must accommodate them. In short, then, unless the defender of (NCA)
involving y would obtain that stops the process. So, while xwould have started cracking when S obtains, it
wouldn’t yet be broke into pieces. But due to S obtaining another state-of-aﬀairs S0 would obtain. Due to
S0 obtaining, another process P 0 of x breaking into pieces would begin and culminate. So, if x were struck,
it would (aer all and despite y) break into pieces.
Now, since S is a state-of-aﬀairs that prevents the manifestation of x’s disposition to break into pieces
when struck without taking away x’s disposition, y is some kind of mask. Furthermore, since S0 is not
state of aﬀairs that involves x being struck, x being broken into pieces in S0 is not a manifestation of x’s
disposition to break into pieces when struck.
Puing this all together, we have a counterexample to Contessa’s analysis: (i) x is intrinsically disposed
to break into pieces when struck, (ii) y is something that interferes with x being disposed to break into
pieces when struck, and (iii) x would break into pieces if it were struck.
¹¹Fara (, p. ).
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further speciﬁes the sense of normality she is appealing to, the threat of counterexample
remains.
A defender of (NCA) may protest that she does not need to specify the exact sense
of normality in (NCA). She may simply rest her case on the intuitive plausibility of the
“Yeah…but normally…” response to situations involving ﬁnks, masks, and Achilles’ heels.
But this will not do.
To see why, let us begin with an observation due to Fara (). is is the observation
that situations that are normal with respect to x being disposed toM when C are situations
where x wouldM if C were the case. Following Fara, we further note that it follows that
if the sense of normality appealed to in (NCA) is one that is relativized to x being disposed
toM when C , the right-hand side of (NCA) is subject to trivialization. It amounts to the
trivial claim that situations where x would M if C were the case are situations where x
wouldM if C were the case.
Now recall the incident involving the poison and the antidote. It may be natural to
respond with “Yeah, the poison didn’t kill you, but normally it would have.” But if asked
why the poison would normally would kill you, it seems to me that one would say “Be-
cause it is disposed to kill when ingested.” But then the sense of normality appealed to
is one that is relativized to the poison being disposed to kill when ingested. If so, the
“Yeah…but normally…” response in this case actually undermines (NCA). It suggests that
the notion of normality appealed to in (NCA) is one that is relativized to x being disposed
toM when C , and thus the right-hand side of (NCA) is subject to trivialization.
So, it would be a mistake to a defender of (NCA) to rest her case on the “Yeah…but nor-
mally…” response to situations involving ﬁnds, masks, and Achilles’ heels. Furthermore,
we’ve seen that unless the defender of (NCA) gives us some reason to think otherwise,
we have reason to believe that the sense of normality appealed to in (NCA) is one that is
relativized to x being disposed to M when C . Consequently, we have reason to believe
that (NCA) is subject to trivialization.¹²
Similar remarks apply to appeals to ideal conditions, typical conditions, or ceteris
paribus conditions.¹³ Moline () nicely captures the typical aitude towards such ap-
peals.
[T]hey are fundamentally dodges…ey amount to muddled ways of disguis-
ing from ourselves more or less serious ignorance of the dispositional prop-
¹²See Hauska () for further concerns about appealing to normality.
¹³See Mumford () and Steinberg ().
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erties of individual things or persons and of types of things or persons.¹⁴
I agree, ceteris paribus. at is, unless an “escape-clause” conditional analysis of disposi-
tions can show that it is legitimate to appeal to its escape-clause(s), it is fundamentally a
dodge. us, the worry isn’t just that such analyses are subject to trivialization. It is also
that, trivialization aside, they are uninformative.¹⁵
. Appealing to proportionality
e conditional analyses we’ve considered so far face either the threat of counterexample,
the threat of trivialization, or a worry about informativeness. Finks, masks, and Achilles’
heels provide the threat of counterexample. Adding some qualiﬁcation or “escape-clause”
to avoid this threat brings with it either the threat of trivialization or a worry about in-
formativeness.
Perhaps, then, we should try to avoid the threat of counterexample some other way.
is is what Manley and Wasserman () try to do with (PROP).
(PROP) Necessarily: x is disposed toM when C iﬀ x wouldM in a suitable proportion
of C-cases.
e basic idea behind (PROP) is that instead of looking at what would happen at the closest
world(s) where C obtains, we look at what would happen in situations (some actual, the
rest merely possible) where C obtains. If a suitable proportion of these situations are
situations where x Ms, then x is disposed toM when C . e converse is alleged to hold
as well.¹⁶
An interesting feature of (PROP) is that situations involving ﬁnks and masks are not
ignored. To illustrate, consider a vase disposed to break when struck and the following
instance of the (PROP).
¹⁴Moline (, pp. -).
¹⁵It should noted that Moline’s complaint isn’t avoided by inventing a new type of conditional with a
semantics that is supposed to model normal conditions, ideal conditions, or ceteris paribus conditions. So,
the conditional analyses of Maurreau (), Gundersen (), and Bonevac et al. () do not avoid
Moline’s complaint. Similar remarks apply to an appeal to context to avoid the counterexamples (see Fara
).
¹⁶One might wonder whether (PROP) is a conditional analysis. Certainly, the right-hand side of (PROP) is
not a subjunctive or indicative conditional and no such conditional is embedded in (PROP). So, how exactly
is it a conditional analysis? Perhaps the idea is that the truth or falsity of the right-hand side depends upon
a bunch of counterfactual facts, facts like xwouldM ifC1 were the case, xwouldn’tM ifC2 were the case,
x wouldM if C3 were the case, and so on. In any case, Manley and Wasserman take it to be a conditional
analysis, and we’ll follow suit.
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() Necessarily, the vase is disposed to break when struck iﬀ the vase would break in a
suitable proportion of cases where it is struck.
ere is no shortage of (nomologically) possible cases where the vase is struck and its
disposition is masked by something or other. ere is also no shortage of (nomologically)
possible cases where the vase is struck but some ﬁnkmakes it lose the disposition to break
when struck. e right-hand side of () takes these cases into consideration. If Manley
and Wasserman are correct, such cases are outweighed by those cases where the vase
is struck and breaks: there is a “suitable” proportion of cases where the vase is struck
and breaks. So, Manley and Wasserman’s strategy for avoiding the problem of ﬁnks and
the problem of masks is not to add at some qualiﬁcation to SCA so that such situations
are properly ignored. Rather, the strategy is to take such situations into consideration
but maintain that there are enough non-ﬁnkish and non-masking situations where the
relevant disposition manifests. Similar remarks apply to problems with Achilles’ heels.
I’m not convinced that this is a successful strategy.¹⁷ It’s clear enough what a coun-
terexample going from le-to-right would look like. We would need x to be disposed to
M when C yet across the relevant region of modal space C-cases are, by and large, cases
where x’s disposition toM is masked or ﬁnked and so x doesn’tM .
My computer’s CPU provides such a counterexample. e CPU is disposed to over-
heat when running a large number of (tasking) processes. at’s why the computer has
a heatsink and fans. When the CPU is running a large number of processes, the heat-
sink and fans mask the CPU’s disposition to overheat when running a large number of
processes. Now creatures smart enough to design such a CPU are also smart enough to
realize that its disposition to overheat when running a large number of processes needs
to be masked/ﬁnked when the CPU is running a large number of processes. And this
isn’t an accident. It holds across the relevant region of modal space that cases where the
CPU is engineered are, by and large, cases where the engineers realize that its disposi-
tion to overheat when running a large number of processes needs to masked/ﬁnked in
some way. So, the relevant region of modal space is such that cases where the CPU is
running a large number of tasking processes are predominantly cases where the CPU’s
disposition to overheat when running a large number of processes is masked or ﬁnked.
So, on any reasonable understanding of “suitable proportion,” it’s not the case the CPU
¹⁷I should also say that I’m not convinced by an argument Manley and Wassermann make against com-
peting conditional analyses. Since this argument also applies to my teleological account of dispositions, I
leave discussion of it for the Appendix.
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would overheat in a suitable proportion of cases where it is running a large number of
tasking processes.¹⁸ Yet the CPU is disposed to overheat when running a large number of
tasking processes. at’s why the heatsink and fans are there. We have a counterexample
to (PROP).¹⁹
Here is similar but more fanciful counterexample. Suppose advanced creatures have
engineered an artifact that is disposed to shaer when struck. While the blueprints for
this artifact were being drawn, the creatures realized that the artifact will be disposed to
shaer when struck. So, not only did they engineer a mask, they also made sure that
the mask would be applied upon creation of the artifact. One more bit of fantasy. is
artifact is so sophisticated that it can only be engineered by creatures smart enough to
realize that the artifact will be disposed to shaer when struck and also realize that some
kind of mask or ﬁnk will need to be engineered and applied upon creation. Well, maybe
lesser creatures could somehow “accidentally” engineer the artifact but the probability
is miniscule. e important point is that across modal space there are hardly any cases
where the artifact is struck and shaers. Granted there are cases where the mask/ﬁnk is
defective, cases where themask/ﬁnk is not applied, and cases where lesser creatures create
the artifact. But such cases are hardly worth noticing. What is worth noticing is that on
any reasonable understanding of “suitable proportion,” it’s false that the artifact would
shaer in a suitable proportion of cases where it is struck. Yet the artifact is disposed to
shaer when struck. at’s why the mask was applied upon creation.
Some may not be convinced by these alleged counterexamples. Regarding the al-
leged counterexample involving my computer’s CPU, one might object that because of
the heatsink and fans, the CPU is not disposed to overheat when running a large number
of processes. is objection, however, seems (to me anyway) to confuse my CPU with
my computer. e laer is not disposed to overheat when the CPU is running a large
number of processes. e former is so disposed. at’s why the heatsink and fans are
there. One might also worry about my claim that, across the relevant region of modal
¹⁸One might worry that there are at least continuum-many cases where the CPU’s disposition is neither
masked nor ﬁnked, the CPU is running a large number of processes, and so its disposition manifests. We
are, aer all, taking modal space into consideration. So, let X be the set of such cases. Surely the set of
cases where the CPU’s disposition is masked or ﬁnked but the CPU is running a large number of processes
has the same cardinality as X . So, how can it be that there are more of the laer cases than the former
cases? Good question. It is, however, a question for Manley and Wasserman to answer. ey oﬀer some
suggestions. Whatever metric they use to justify the appeal to proportionality, it had beer come out that
my CPU wouldn’t overheat in a suitable proportion of cases where it is running a large number of (tasking)
processes.
¹⁹is scenario is also a counterexample to the variant of (PROP) found in Wasserman ().
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space, cases where the CPU is engineered are, by and large, cases where the engineers
realize that its disposition to overheat when running a large number of processes needs
to be masked/ﬁnked in some way. Maybe engineers (across modal space) don’t have to be
that smart to engineer the CPU. I don’t think so, but suppose I’m wrong. What about the
counterexample involving the super sophisticated artifact? I ﬁnd it hard to believe that
such an artifact is impossible.²⁰
. A diﬀerent direction
e problems raised for the above conditional analyses do not show that there is no sat-
isfactory conditional analysis of dispositions. But they do motivate a move in a diﬀerent
direction. at is, they at least provide some reason for considering an account of dispo-
sitions that does not rest on a conditional analysis of dispositions. So, I propose that we
look in a diﬀerent direction. In particular, I propose that we look towards a teleological
account of dispositions.
 A teleological account of dispositions
. Preliminary remarks
e move towards a teleological account of dispositions is not motivated solely by the
shortcomings of the above conditional analyses. It’s also motivated by the intuition that
dispositions are, in some sense, directed at their manifestations.
Some may claim to not have this intuition. To them, I point to Goodman’s famous
characterization of dispositions in terms “threats and promises.”²¹ Goodman’s metaphor
captures an important intuition about dispositions. And it seems prey clear that this
intuition is the directedness intuition. So, if you are not sure whether you have the di-
rectedness intuition, check whether you get the metaphor. If you get it, you have the
intuition.
Some may doubt that the directedness intuition should be given much weight when
evaluating an account of dispositions. Perhaps the stronger intuition is that there is an
²⁰Manley and Wasserman () suggest that (PROP) may have to be revised so that some C-cases are
weighed more heavily than others. So, perhaps this is a way to avoid the above counterexamples. But then,
as Cross () notes, it’s hard to see how (PROP) is an improvement over appeals to normal conditions,
ideal conditions, or ceteris paribus conditions.
²¹Goodman (, p. ).
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important connection between dispositions and conditionals, and if we could only get this
connection straight, we would have a conditional analysis of dispositions that explains,
in some deﬂationary way, intuitions about the directedness of dispositions.
As a ﬁrst step in developing a teleological account of dispositions, I turn this concern
around and into argument for appealing to teleology in giving an account of dispositions.
In particular, I argue that by appealing to teleology we can actually provide a counterex-
ample free and informative connection between dispositions and conditionals.
. e ﬁrst step
Consider the following passage from Lewis ().
Sometimes it takes some time for a disposition to do its work. When stimu-
lus s arrives and the disposition is present, some process begins…When the
process reaches completion, then that is, or that causes, response r. But if the
disposition went away part-way through, the process would be aborted.²²
To foreshadow what is to come, I claim that the processes Lewis describes are teleological
processes. But before saying anymore about this, we need to slightly amend what Lewis
says.
Masking cases show that even if the stimulus condition arrives and the disposition
remains, there need not be some process that begins and ends with a manifestation of
the disposition. So, taking masks into consideration, suppose Lewis had said something
slightly diﬀerent. Something like this:
Sometimes it takes some time for a disposition to do its work. When the
disposition is activated, some process begins. When the process reaches com-
pletion, then that is, or that causes, response r. But if the disposition went
away part-way through, the process would be aborted. Nonetheless, if noth-
ing were to interfere with this process, there would be response r.
We would then have the following activation principle in place:
(AV) If x’s disposition toM when C is activated, then either x immediatelyMs or there
is some process such that if the process were to continue without interruption, x
wouldM .
²²Lewis (, p. ).
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I claim that (AV) is counterexample free. Before oﬀering support for this claim, I need to
clarify a distinction (AV) relies upon. is is the distinction between a disposition being
activated and the stimulus condition for the disposition obtaining.
Certain masking cases illustrate the distinction. Distinguish between two types of
masking cases: those in which a disposition is manifesting but does not manifest because
of a mask, and those in which a mask prevents even a partial manifestation of the dis-
position even though the stimulus condition obtains. Call the former “Type-” masking
cases and the laer “Type-” masking cases. e case of the poison that is killing you
but doesn’t kill you because of the antidote is an example of a Type- masking case. For
an example of a Type- masking case, consider a vase disposed to break when dropped
but wrapped in bubble-wrap. It’s dropped and doesn’t break. It seems plausible that
the bubble-wrap not only prevented a manifestation of the disposition but also a partial
manifestation of the disposition. Furthermore, it seems plausible that the bubble-wrap
prevented even a partial manifestation of the disposition because it prevented the dis-
position from being activated in the ﬁrst place. e disposition remained dormant even
though the stimulus condition obtained. Similar remarks apply to my CPU’s disposition
to overheat when running a large number of processes. e fans and heatsink prevent the
disposition from being activated when the CPU is running a large number of processes.
Generalizing, Type- masking cases are cases where the stimulus condition obtains, the
disposition remains, but the disposition is not activated.
Cases involving ﬁnks also illustrate the distinction. When does the electro-ﬁnk run-
ning on reverse cyclemake thewire lose its disposition to conduct electricitywhen touched
by a conductor? Well, when the wire is touched by a conductor. But does the ﬁnk do its
work instantaneously?²³ If so, the instant the wire is touched by a conductor, it is not
disposed to conduct electricity. If not, there is some an instant or interval of time where
the wire is touched by a conductor and disposed to conduct electricity when touched by a
conductor. In the ﬁrst case, the disposition is not activated because it’s no longer present.
In the second case, it’s not clear whether the disposition is momentarily activated before
the ﬁnk does its work. If it isn’t, then we have a case where the stimulus condition obtains
but the disposition isn’t activated.²⁴ Generalizing, it seems that (reverse) ﬁnks can work
in one of three ways. ey can make it so that the disposition goes away the instant the
stimulus condition obtains, and so the disposition is not activated because it’s no longer
²³Lewis () calls this “a dilemma about timing.”
²⁴My intuitions, though not entirely clear, are that the disposition isn’t activated.
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there. ey canmake it so that the disposition goes awaywhen the stimulus condition ob-
tains but before the disposition is activated. And they can make it so that the disposition
goes way aer the disposition is activated but before the disposition manifests. Instances
of the ﬁrst two ways bring out the distinction between a disposition being activated and
the stimulus condition of the disposition obtaining.
It should be clear, then, that there is a distinction between a disposition being activated
and the stimulus condition of the disposition obtaining. Of course, there is a connection
between the two. For a disposition to be activated, its stimulus condition must obtain.
Likewise, though perhaps this is obvious, the activation of the disposition requires that
the disposition is present.
Let’s return to (AV). I claim that (AV) is counterexample free. Type- masking cases
pose no threat. In such cases, the disposition is activated but doesn’t manifest because of
the mask. Nonetheless, when the disposition was activated, there was thereby a process
such that were that process to continue without interruption, there would be a manifesta-
tion of the disposition. Type- masking cases pose no threat. In such cases, the disposition
isn’t activated. Finks pose no threat. Either the ﬁnk makes it so that the disposition isn’t
activated when the stimulus condition obtains or it makes it so that the disposition goes
away aer it has been activated but before it manifests. In the ﬁrst case, there is obviously
no threat to (AV). In the second case, there is no threat to (AV) because if it weren’t the ﬁnk
the disposition would have manifested. And this is so because when the disposition was
activated, there was thereby a process such that if the process were to continue without
interruption, there would be a manifestation of the disposition. So, (AV) has no problems
with the problem of ﬁnks or the problem of masks.
What about Achilles’ heels? My intuitions suggest that the concrete block with the
Achilles’ heel has two dispositions. Because it is sturdy, it is disposed to remain intact
when struck. Because of its Achilles’ heel, there is a particular spot s and a particular
amount of force f such that the block is disposed to shaer when struck with force f in
spot s. Suppose the block is struck with force f in spot s and its disposition to shaer
when struck with force f in spot smanifests. My intuitions suggest that even though the
block was struck, its disposition to remain intact when struck wasn’t activated. What was
activated was its Achilles’ heel.
But some may have the intuition that if the block is disposed to shaer when struck
with force f in spot s, then it can’t be disposed to remain intact when struck. To them,
I say consider Achilles. e greatest warrior of the Trojan War was not disposed to fall
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when struck. He was disposed to withstand harm when struck. However, because of his
Achilles’ heel, he was also disposed to fall when struck in the just the right spot. When
Achilles was struck in just the right spot, his disposition to fall when struck in the just the
right spot was activated and subsequently manifested. Was his disposition to withstand
harm when struck activated? My intuitions suggest that it wasn’t. If I’m right, there is
no threat to (AV). If I’m wrong, there is a threat to (AV) only if when Achilles was struck
in just the right spot, there wasn’t thereby a process such that if the process were to con-
tinue without interruption, Achilles’ disposition to withstand harm when struck would
manifest. My intuitions aren’t entirely because I don’t have the intuition that Achilles’
disposition to withstand harm when struck was activated in the ﬁrst place. But it does
seem to me that if this disposition was activated, there was such a process. And what
interfered with it was the activation of Achilles’ Achilles’ heel. So, in either case, there is
no threat to (AV). Generalizing, we can think of cases involving Achilles’ heels as special
cases of masking. If the case is a Type- masking case, then the relevant disposition is
manifesting but doesn’tmanifest because of the activation of an Achilles’ heel. If the case
is a Type- masking case, then the activation of an Achilles’ heel prevents the relevant
disposition from being activated in the ﬁrst place. In either case, there is no threat to (AV).
So, since I can think of no other potential threat to (AV), I conjecture that (AV) is
counterexample free.²⁵ However, there is still an issue that needs to be resolved.
e issue is that (AV) is an “escape-clause” account of the relationship between dispo-
sitions, their activation, and their manifestation. To give a few simple examples:
• If D is activated, then, ceteris paribus, it manifests.
• In normal/ideal/typical circumstances, if D activated, it manifests.
• If D is activated, then, provided nothing interferes, it manifests.
Moline’s remark about such proposals bears repeating.
[T]hey are fundamentally dodges…ey amount to muddled ways of disguis-
ing from ourselves more or less serious ignorance of the dispositional proper-
ties of individual things or persons and of types of things or persons. (Moline
, p. -)
²⁵Jenkins and Nolan () argue that its possible for there to be dispositions with impossible manifesta-
tions. However, their alleged examples pose no threat to (AV). ey oﬀer no example of disposition such
that it’s possible for the disposition to be activated but impossible for there to be even a partial manifestation
of the disposition.
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As I said above, I agree, ceteris paribus. With respect to (AV), this means that if we don’t
have some reason for thinking that it is legitimate to appeal to the notion of a process
continuing without interruption, (AV) is simply a way to disguise more or less serious
ignorance of the relationship between dispositions, their activation, and their manifesta-
tion.
(AV), however, can be legitimized by appealing to teleology. Consider the following
passage from Makin ().
[I]f it is appropriate to view a [process] teleologically, it is therefore also ap-
propriate to apply other notions: interference, interruption, hindrance, and a
normal outcome. It makes sense to talk of a teleological process being inter-
rupted…at is because a teleological process has a privileged stage to which
it runs in normal conditions, unless interfered with or hindered: the [end] to
which it is directed.²⁶
Makin is oﬀering an explanation of why Aristotle oen appeals to teleological notions
in discussing the nature of his distinction between potentiality and actuality and, in par-
ticular, why actuality is prior to potentiality. Puing Aristotle aside, it shouldn’t be too
diﬃcult to see how Makin’s insight is relevant to (AV).
Makin’s insight is that if a process is a teleological process, then it is legitimate to ap-
peal to the notion of the process continuing without interruption. It’s legitimate because
of the following principle governing teleological processes.
(TP) If a process p is directed at end E, then: in virtue of p being directed at end E, if p
were to continue without interruption, E would be the case.
(AV) follows from the conjunction of (TP) and (T).
(T) If x’s disposition toM when C is activated, then either (a) x immediatelyMs, or (b)
there is some process directed at the end that x Ms.
Given (T), we thus have good reason for thinking (AV) isn’t fundamentally a dodge. On
the contrary, it’s a consequence of (T), which is a substantive thesis about the relationship
between dispositions, their activation, and their manifestation.
So I oﬀer (T) to those looking for an interesting and counterexample free connection
between dispositions and conditionals. If you accept my oﬀer, you’ll get (CDC).
²⁶Makin (), p. .
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(CDC) Necessarily: if x is disposed to M when C , x’s disposition to M when C is acti-
vated, and x doesn’t immediatelyM , then there is some process such that:
(?) if the process were to continue without interruption, x wouldM .
(T) may seem like a steep price to pay for an interesting and counterexample free
connection between dispositions and conditionals. However, the point remains that by
appealing to teleology, we can actually provide an interesting and counterexample free
connection between dispositions and conditionals. us, those who think that the direct-
edness of dispositions can be explained, in some deﬂationary way, by some interesting
connection between dispositions and conditionals have a worry to contend with if we
can oﬀer an account of dispositions that explains the directedness of dispositions and, in
doing so, explains why (T) holds. e worry is that the directedness of dispositions is
what explains why there is some interesting connection between dispositions and condi-
tionals.
e stage is now set for a teleological account of dispositions.
. e proposal
Following Molnar (), I claim that directedness is what sets dispositions apart from
non-dispositional properties. ere seems to be no sense in which a triangular object is,
in virtue of being triangular, in a state directed at the occurrence of some event.²⁷ On
the other hand, there seems to be some sense in which a vase disposed to break when
struck is, in virtue of being so disposed, in a state directed at the occurrence of an event
in which the vase breaks. Such intuitions provide some initial justiﬁcation for the claim
that directedness is what sets dispositions apart from non-dispositional properties. But, of
course, more needs be said about exactlywhat type of directedness is alleged to distinguish
dispositions from non-dispositional properties.
I say that teleological directedness is what sets dispositions apart fromnon-dispositional
properties. (T) spells out the details.
(T) Necessarily: a property P is a disposition iﬀ there is a condition C and event-type
M such that necessarily, P is the property of being in a state directed at the end
that oneMs when C .
²⁷Inspired by Mellor (), some might claim that a triangular object is, in virtue of being triangular, in
a state directed at the occurrence of an event in which its sides are counted and the result is three. I don’t
have this intuition.
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(T.) follows from (T).
(T.) Necessarily: a property P is a disposition iﬀ there is a condition C and event-type
M such that: necessarily, x has P iﬀ x is in a state directed at the end that x Ms
when C .
So, what makes a disposition a disposition is that the property just is the property of being
in a state directed at a certain teleological end. Consequently, to have a disposition just is
to be in a state directed a certain teleological end.
(T) does not specify the relation between the property of being disposed toM when
C and the property of being in a state directed at the end that one Ms when C . Sure
enough, the property of being disposed toM when C is a disposition. But all that follows
from (T) is that there is some C andM such that the property of being disposed toM
when C is the property of being in a state directed at the end that oneMs when C.
I propose that the identity relation holds between the property of being disposed to
M when C and the property of being in a state directed at the end that oneMs when C .
(T) Necessarily: the property of being disposed toM when C just is the property being
in a state directed at the end that oneMs when C .
It follows from (T) that necessarily, x is disposed toM when C just in case x is in a state
directed at the end that x Ms when C .
With (T) in hand, we turn to the question: what happens when C obtains and x is
disposed toM when C?
My answer is that what happens depends onwhether x’s disposition is activated when
C obtains. If x’s disposition isn’t activated, then nothing of interest happens with respect
to x being disposed toM when C . at is, the disposition remains dormant. However, if
x’s disposition is activated, something of interest does happen. In particular, in virtue of
x being disposed toM when C , either x immediatelyMs or there is a process directed at
the end that x Ms. Given (T), we thus get (T).
(T) If x’s disposition toM whenC is activated, then in virtue of x being in a state directed
at the end that xMs when C , either x immediatelyMs or there is a process directed
at the end that x Ms.
So, the teleological directedness of a disposition does some work when the disposition is
activated. It also explains why (T) holds.
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e conjunction of (T), (T), and (T) constitute my teleological account of disposi-
tions: (TAD), for short.
A concrete example may help clarify (TAD). Consider the property of being disposed
to dissolve when in water. (T) tells us that this property just is the property of being in a
state directed at the end that one dissolves when in water. (T), then, tells us the property
of being disposed to dissolve when in water is a disposition. (Nothing new.) But it also
tells us that what makes this property a disposition is that it is the property of being in a
state directed at the end that one dissolves when in water. Now consider a chuck of salt
disposed to dissolve when in water. Suppose the salt is placed in water and it’s disposition
is activated. (T) tells that in virtue of the salt being in a state directed at the end that it
dissolves when in water, either the salt immediately dissolves or there is a process directed
at the end that the salt dissolves. Supposing the salt does not instantaneously dissolve,
there is then a process directed at the end that the salt dissolves. If this telos of the process
were to obtain, there would be a manifestation of the salt’s disposition. If this telos doesn’t
obtain, there is no manifestation in this particular circumstance (but if the process had
continued its normal course without interruption, the telos would have obtained).
e argument for (TAD) is that it explains the directedness of dispositions, and in do-
ing so, provides an interesting and counterexample free connection between dispositions
and conditionals. is wouldn’t be much of an argument if a competing account of dis-
positions provides both a beer explanation of the directedness of dispositions and an
interesting and counterexample free connection between dispositions and conditionals.
So, we’ll have to see what the competition has to oﬀer.
Before comparing (TAD) to its rivals, though, we should address a concern that I’m
sure has gnawing away at some.
 A detour
. Seriously?
e concern can be put like this: “You can’t be serious.” We can categorize those with
such a concern into three groups.
First, there are those who, seing aside the analogy, would dogmatically agree with
Francis Bacon’s remark that “inquiry into ﬁnal causes is sterile, and, like a virgin conse-
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crated to God, produces nothing.”²⁸ Second, there are those who think that inquiry into
ﬁnal causes has a place, provided that place concerns the goals of agents or the purposes
of the artifacts they design. For them, a teleological account of dispositions is commied
to projecting mental states to properties or treating them as artifacts, and so is absurd.
ird, there are those who allow for so-called “natural teleology” but restrict it to the
function or proper function of features of organisms. For them, a teleological account of
dispositions is, at best, commied to treating dispositions as biological functions, and so
is hardly worth considering.
e dogmatists can be ignored since nothing can be said to make them change their
minds. e simple response to the other two groups is that while teleology is oen tied up
in talk of goals, purposes, design, function, proper function, and sometimes talk of certain
outcomes being beer than others, there is no reason to assume that teleology must be
tied up in such talk. So, don’t make this assumption when considering (TAD). ere is a
general notion of teleological directedness that outstrips talk of goals, purposes, design,
and function. It is this general notion at play in (TAD).
Some might not be convinced by the simple response. ey might want some reason,
independent of my argument for (TAD), to take seriously a general notion of teleological
directedness that outstrips talk of goals, purposes, design, and function.
To this end, we take a detour from dispositions and turn to sentences in the progressive
aspect.
. e progressive aspect and events in progress
Here are some examples of sentences in the progressive aspect.
() a. Steve is driving to Boston.
b. A chunk of salt is dissolving.
c. e universe is expanding.
(a) says that there is an event of Steve driving to Boston in progress, (b) says that there
is an event of some salt dissolving in progress, and (c) says that there is an event of the
universe expanding in progress. So it is in general: a sentence in the progressive aspect
says that there is an event of some type in progress. Indeed, this is the core semantic
intuition about the progressive aspect.
²⁸De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bk. iii, Ch. , quoted inWoodﬁeld (, p. ) and Hawthorne (, p. ).
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e orthodox approach to capturing the core intuition is to oﬀer a modal analysis
of the progressive.²⁹ e appeal to modality usually starts with the observation that an
event in progress need not culminate.³⁰ Steve could be driving to Boston but be forced
to turn around due to car troubles. A chunk salt could be dissolving but be taken out of
water before it (fully) dissolves. In such cases, there is an event in progress that doesn’t
culminate. But what if Steve’s drive hadn’t been interrupted by car troubles? Presumably,
he would have drove to Boston. And what if the salt hadn’t been taken out of water?
Presumably, it would have (fully) dissolved. Generalizing, the basic idea is that while an
event in progress need not culminate, it nonethelesswould culminate if it were to continue
without interruption. As far as I can tell, this “no-interruption” intuition is what spurs
modal analyses of the progressive.
Bypassing the details of a semantics for the progressive the captures the no-interruption
intuition, let’s just focus on the account of events in progress suggested by the no-interruption
intuition. It’s helpful here to appeal to resultant states. So, let me say a word about
resultant states, and then oﬀer the account of events in progress suggested by the no-
interruption intuition.
A resultant state of an event is a state of the event having occurred or taken place.
For example, suppose Mirah drew a circle. As a result of this event taking place, a state
of Mirah having drawn a circle obtains. is state of Mirah having drawn a circle is a
resultant state of the event.
If this example doesn’t help, here is a heuristic that may. Take a sentence in the simple
past which describes an event and form its present perfect correlate. en, think of the
present perfect sentence as describing the (relevant) resultant state of the event described
by the simple past sentence. For example, in the sentences that follow think of each
b-sentence as describing the (relevant) resultant state of the event described by the a-
sentence.
() a. Steve drove to Boston.
b. Steve has driven to Boston.
() a. A chunk of salt (fully) dissolved.
²⁹See Dowty (), Asher (), Landman (), Bonomi (), Portner (), Higginbotham (),
and Hallman ().
³⁰is observation is one way of puing what is called the “imperfective paradox” in the literature on
the progressive. Another way of puing the imperfective paradox is that a past progressive does not, in
general, entail its perfective correlate. For instance, ‘Steve was driving to Boston’ does not entail ‘Steve
drove to Boston’.
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b. A chunk of salt has (fully) dissolved.
() a. e universe expanded.
b. e universe has expanded.
To put it yet another way, think of (b) as saying that a state of Steve having driven to
Boston now holds, think of (b) as saying that a state of the chunk of salt having (fully) dis-
solved now holds, and think of (b) as saying that a state of the universe having expanded
now holds. Such states are resultant states of particular events.³¹
With resultant states suitably clariﬁed, we can now oﬀer the account of events in
progress suggested by the no-interruption intuition.
(NI) Necessarily, e is a ' event in progress at t iﬀ e would bring about a resultant of a '
event if it were to continue past t without interruption.
For instance, an event is an event of the universe expanding in progress (at t) just in case
the event would bring about a state of the universe having expanded if it were to continue
(past t) without interruption.
ere are, however, two problems with (NI). e ﬁrst is the right-to-le direction is
subject to counterexample. e second is that the le-to-right direction is subject to a
worry about informativeness.
Our counterexample is a variant of a scenario due to Landman (). Suppose Mary
is delusional and thinks she needs to swim to the other side of the Atlantic to save her
soul. Mary is not only delusional but also a very bad swimmer. So, she enters the Atlantic
around Boston, swims for a hour, and then drowns. Mary was trying to swim to the other
side of the Atlantic but she wasn’t actually swimming to the other side of the Atlantic.
Indeed, this case is a nice example of the diﬀerence between trying to do something and
actually doing what you are are trying to do. But what if Mary’s swim had continued
without interruption. Well, she wouldn’t have drown. Likewise, she wouldn’t be eaten
by a shark or be saved by a ﬁshing boat. In short, the swim would have continued on
until she miraculously reaches some place on the other side. So, we have an event that
is not an event in progress of Mary swimming to the other side of the Atlantic but is one
that would bring about a state of Mary having swum to the other side of the Atlantic if it
³¹ere are analyses of the perfect that involve quantiﬁcation over resultant states, and so take the above
paraphrases to be semantically signiﬁcant. See Parsons (), Kratzer (), and Higginbotham ().
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were to continuewithout interruption. us, we have a counterexample to the right-to-le
direction of (NI).
e worry about informativeness is that unless more is said about what counts as an
interruption of a' event in progress, we have no reason not to think of an interruption of a
' event in progress as simply something that prevents it from bringing about the resultant
state of a ' event. We should just as well treat an interruption of an event in progress of
Steve driving to Boston as simply something that prevents the event from bringing about
a state of Steve having driven to Boston. So, the claim that an event in progress of Steve
driving to Boston would bring about a state of Steve having driven to Boston if it were
to continue without interruption amounts to the uninformative claim that this event in
progress would bring about such a state unless something prevented it from doing so. In
short, unless something more is said about what counts as an interruption of a ' event in
progress, the le-to-right direction of (NI) amounts to the uninformative claim that a '
event in progress would bring about a resultant state of a ' event unless some prevents
from it doing so.
Perhaps there is a way to modify (NI) so that it avoids the threat of counterexample
and the worry about informativeness. Suﬃce it to say that as in the case of conditional
analyses of dispositions, there is no modal analysis of the progressive that is widely rec-
ognized to be informative and counterexample free.³² So, someone who is sympathetic to
a modal account of events in progress has her work cut out for her.
ere is, however, an account of events in progress that not only explains the no-
interruption intuition but also explains another intuition about events in progress. is is
the intuition that an event in progress is in some sense directed at bringing about a certain
state-of-aﬀairs. Surely, an event in progress of Steve driving to Boston is in some sense
directed at bringing about a state-of-aﬀairs in which Steve has driven to Boston. Surely,
an event in progress of a chunk of salt dissolving is in some sense directed at bringing
about a state-of-aﬀairs in which the salt has (fully) dissolved. Surely, an event in progress
of the universe expanding is in some sense directed at bringing about a state-of-aﬀairs in
which the universe has expanded. So, it is in general: events in progress have some kind
of directedness.
I claim that the directedness of events in progress is a teleological directedness: for
an event in progress to be directed at a certain state-of-aﬀairs is for the relevant state-
³²See Szabó (), Szabó (), and Kroll () for arguments against modal analyses of the progres-
sive.
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of-aﬀairs to be a telos of the event in progress. More speciﬁcally, I propose the following
teleological account of events in progress.
(EIP) Necessarily, e is a ' event in progress at t iﬀ e is, at t, directed at the end that it
cause the resultant state of a ' event to obtain at some t0 > t.
So, for example, an event is an event in progress of Steve driving to Boston (at t) iﬀ it is an
event that is (at t) directed at the end that it cause a state of Steve having driven to Boston
to obtain (at some later t0).³³
(EIP) explains the directedness intuition about events in progress. It also explains the
no-interruption intuition. Recall Makin’s insight.
(TP) If a process p is directed at end E, then: in virtue of p being directed at end E, if p
were to continue without interruption, E would be the case.
(EIP) treats events in progress as teleological processes. us, (E) follows from (EIP).
(E) If e is a ' event in progress at t, then e would bring about a resultant state of a '
event if it were to continue past t without interruption.³⁴
³³(EIP) should not be understood as a complicated way of saying that an event in progress is directed
at the end that it culminate. To see why, let e be a suﬃciently extended event in progress of the universe
expanding. For each expansion of the universe during this time, there is a corresponding resultant state of
the universe having expanded that is brought about by e. But e doesn’t culminate each time it brings about
a state of the universe having expanded. Indeed, as an event in progress of universe expanding, e is not
associated with any kind of culmination. What (EIP) basically tells us is that even if e brings about a state
of the universe having expanded at some moment t, it is still, at t, directed at bringing about a later state
of the universe having expanded. So, while e is not directed at any kind of culmination, it is still, at each
moment, directed at bringing about further expansion of the universe. In short, some events in progress are
(teleologically) directed at culminating, other aren’t, but all are (teleologically) directed at bringing about a
later resultant state.
³⁴(E) is simply the le-to-right direction of (NI). So, I am commied to this direction of (NI) being coun-
terexample free. e only alleged counterexample I aware of is due to Szabó (). Szabó asks us to
consider a young boy, Frank, who starts enumerating prime numbers in sequence: two, three, ﬁve, seven,
eleven, thirteen, and so on. According to Szabó, uering ‘Frank is enumerating the primes’ is an accurate
description of what Frank is doing. But it’s not possible for Frank to enumerate the primes. So, it’s not
possible to there to be a resultant state of an event in which Frank enumerates the primes. us, if ‘Frank
is enumerating the primes’ is an accurate description of what Frank is doing, we would appear to have a
counterexample to (E).
I’m not convinced. Suppose Frank’s mother uers ‘Frank is enumerating the primes’ to describe what
Frank is doing and you overhear the uerance. Suppose you ask: “All of the primes or some of the primes?”
If the mother were to respond with “All of the primes,” she would be saying something false. On the other
hand, if the mother were to respond with “Some of the primes,” she would by saying something true. It
seems, then, that taking the mother to be saying something true when she uers ‘Frank is enumerating the
primes’ rests on taking her to be communicating the proposition that Frank was enumerating some of the
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So, (EIP) explains the intuition that spurs modal accounts of events in progress. Further-
more, the informativeness worry is no longer a worry. (E) is a consequence of (EIP),
which is a substantive thesis about events in progress.
Here, then, is an argument, independent of my argument for (TAD), to take seriously
a general notion of teleological directedness that outstrips talk of goals, purposes, design,
and function. (EIP) is an account of events in progress that explains the directedness
intuition and explains the intuition that motivates its rivals (i.e., modal accounts). So, we
have good reason to take (EIP) seriously. e notion of teleological directedness in (EIP) is
a general notion that outstrips talk of goals, purposes, design, and function. For example,
bringing about a state of the universe having expanded is not a goal, purpose, or function
of an event in progress of the universe expanding, and I see no reason to think such an
event in progress was designed to bring about such a state.
So, since we have reason to take (EIP) seriously, we have reason to take seriously a
general notion of teleological directedness that outstrips talk of goals, purposes, design,
and function.
I have not provided a detailed defense of (EIP) over its rivals.³⁵ But the purpose of
our detour isn’t to provide a detailed defense of (EIP). It’s to provide some independent
reason to take seriously a general notion of teleological directedness. Let us, then, return
to dispositions by comparing (TAD) to its rivals.
. Against the competition
e competition falls into two camps. e ﬁrst camp consists of accounts of dispositions
that rest upon a conditional analysis of dispositions. e second camp consists of accounts
of dispositions that appeal to a diﬀerent type of directedness.³⁶
primes. If this is right (and I think it is), then the scenario is not a counterexample to (E). To be such a
scenario Frank would have to be enumerating all of the primes, which he obviously is not doing. Rather,
the scenario is one where Frank is enumerating some of the primes, and he obviously can enumerate some
of the primes.
³⁵See Kroll () for such a defense of (EIP).
³⁶ere is a possible third camp. Following Fara (), one might reject conditional analyses but oﬀer a
“habitual” account of dispositions in which being disposed toM whenC just is having an intrinsic property
in virtue of which oneMs whenC . I do not consider this possible third camp to provide actual competition
to (TAD) because the counterexamples I oﬀered to (PROP) serve as counterexamples to a habitual account
of dispositions: my CPU does not have an intrinsic property in virtue of which it overheats when running a
large number of processes, yet it is disposed to overheat when running a large number of processes (that’s
why the heatsink and fans are there). If you are skeptical of my counterexamples to (PROP), seeWasserman
() for reasons to be skeptical of the prospects of a habitual account of dispositions.
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We have yet to see a satisfactory (i.e., counterexample free and informative) condi-
tional analysis of dispositions. is is a problem for the ﬁrst camp. It also makes com-
paring (TAD) to the competition from the ﬁrst camp rather diﬃcult. Furthermore, there
doesn’t seem to be much motivation for continuing the search for a satisfactory condi-
tional analysis if we can oﬀer an account of dispositions that explains both the direct-
edness of dispositions and provides a connection between dispositions and conditionals.
(TAD) is such an account of dispositions.
ose sympathetic to conditional analyses might respond by claiming that we want a
deﬂationary account of dispositions, andwe get what wewant only if there is a counterex-
ample free and informative conditional analysis of dispositions. ey might remind me of
something else Goodman said–namely, that it would be ideal to explain what dispositions
are without “any reference to occult powers.”³⁷ I have two things to say in response.
First, a conditional analysis of dispositions does not tell us what dispositions are.³⁸ All
it provides is a schematic biconditonal whose instances are alleged to be truths. Recall
(SCA).
(SCA) Necessarily: x is disposed toM when C iﬀ x wouldM if C were the case.
AsManley () notes, you could accept (SCA) and hold a reductive functionalist account
of dispositions in which the property of being disposed toM when C just is the second-
order property of having a non-dispositional property P in virtue of which one wouldM
if C were the case. Or you could hold a similar but non-reductive functionalist account
of the dispositions. Or you could accept (SCA) yet hold that the disposition toM when C
just is the property of being such that one wouldM ifC were the case. Of course, it would
be a mistake to accept (SCA). But the point is that if you are worried about occult powers,
a conditional analysis of dispositions by itself isn’t enough to relieve your worries. You
need an account of dispositions that does not require occult powers.
Second, we don’t want a deﬂationary account of dispositions if a deﬂationary account
of dispositions is one that rejects the possibility of a disposition being fundamental prop-
erty (i.e., a property that “carves the world at its joints”). Dispositional essentialists argue
that any account of dispositions that rejects the possibility of fundamental dispositions
is badly mistaken.³⁹ According to such theorists, our best science tells that at least some
fundamental properties of the actual world are dispositions. Just consider spin, charge,
³⁷Goodman (, p. ).
³⁸Manley () stresses the importance of this point, and, I should say, inspired this ﬁrst response.
³⁹See Ellis (), Molnar (), and Bird ().
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and mass. Our best science tells us that these properties are fundamental properties. And
surely spin, charge, and mass are dispositions. Witness Ellis and Lierse ():
With few exceptions, the most fundamental properties that we know about
are all dispositional…erefore, wemust either suppose that these basic prop-
erties are not truly fundamental…or else we must concede that categorical
realism is false.⁴⁰
We’ll understand categorical realism is the view that no disposition is a fundamental prop-
erty (i.e., no property that carves the actual world by its joints is a disposition). Ellis and
Lierse’s challenge to the categorical realist is straightforward. Either show that charge,
for instance, is not a disposition or show that it’s not a fundamental property. Good luck
with either disjunct.
I will not take a stand on whether or not luck is on the categorical realist’s side. Maybe
our best science will change. Or maybe there is some interpretation of our current best
science in which charge is not a fundamental property or at least not a disposition.
I will, however, take a stand on the possibility of there being something like charge that
is a disposition and a fundamental property. Let’s stipulate d-charge is the property the
fundamental particles of the actual world would have if what the dispositional essentialist
says about charge is correct. In other words, if the dispositional essentialist is right about
charge, then d-charge is charge. Could there be a world w in which the fundamental
entities of w have d-charge as a fundamental property? e dispositional essentialist says
the actual world is such a world. I say that such a world is possible and so its possible for
there to be a disposition that is a fundamental property.
Let’s now put aside whether (TAD) undermines the motivation for analyzing dispo-
sitions in terms of conditionals. We’ll just suppose that we have a counterexample free
and informative conditional analysis. I argue that even with such an analysis, there is rea-
son to favor (TAD), and the reason comes from the possibility of a basic or fundamental
disposition.
For the sake of concreteness, suppose (PROP) is a counterexample free and informative
analysis of dispositions. Now suppose that x is disposed toM when C . en, () follows
from (PROP).
() x wouldM in a suitable proportion of C-cases.
⁴⁰Ellis and Lierse (, p. ).
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Further suppose that the property of being disposed to M when C is a basic or funda-
mental property. Presumedly, then, there is something about the disposition itself that
explains why () is the case. What could it be?
One option is that the property of being disposed toM when C just is the property of
being such that one wouldM in a suitable proportion of C-cases.⁴¹ Taking this approach,
we would be commied to primitive counterfactual facts, and so would be commied to
denying the plausible principle that what something would do depends on how it is. But
maybe that principle needs to be rejected once we consider the possibility of fundamental
dispositions.
Another option is to add (PROP) to (TAD) but deny that the property of being disposed
toM when C just is the property of being such that one wouldM is a suitable proportion
of C-cases. Taking this approach, we would be commied to primitive teleological facts
that explain certain counterfactual facts. In other words, the position would be that () is
the case in virtue of () being the case.
() x is in a state directed at the end that x Ms when C .
So, by appealing to (TAD), we don’t have to reject the principle that what something
would do depends on how it is. us, there is reason to favor the appeal to (TAD).
Generalizing, I make the following objection to the ﬁrst camp. We want an account
of dispositions that does not rule out the possibility of a disposition being a fundamen-
tal property. e ﬁrst camp promises to provide a counterexample free and informative
conditional analysis of dispositions. Suppose they provide such an analysis. ere is still
reason to favor (TAD) so long as (TAD) is compatible with the analysis. e reason is
that (TAD) provides an account of dispositions that allows us to retain the principle that
what something would do depends on how it is even in the case where that thing has a
fundamental disposition.⁴²
I conclude, then, there isn’t much of a challenge from the ﬁrst camp. First, they have
⁴¹See Manley ().
⁴²It should be noted that accepting (TAD) does not imply accepting the possibility of fundamental dispo-
sitions. Suppose we were to add (T) to (TAD).
(T) Necessarily: the property of being in a state directed at the end that one Ms when C just is the
second-order property of having a non-dispositional property I in virtue of which: if C were to
obtain, either x would immediatelyM or there would be a process directed at the end that x Ms.
(TAD) would now entail that it is impossible for a disposition to be a fundamental property. Of course,
(T) would be subject to counterexample, and (T) would be subject to overdetermination worries. But that
seems to go with the territory.
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yet to provide a satisfactory conditional analysis from which they can issue a challenge.
Second, even if they can provide such an analysis, there is a challenge only if they can
show that the analysis is incompatible with (TAD) or show that it is impossible for a
disposition to be a fundamental property.
Let’s turn to the second camp. e competition from the second camp appeals to a dif-
ferent type of directedness in providing an account of dispositions. Whereas I claim that
the directedness of dispositions is teleological, the second camp claims that the directed-
ness of dispositions has something to do with intentionality. For lack of a beer name,
we’ll call members of the second camp “intentionality-based” accounts of dispositions.⁴³
Intentionality-based accounts of dispositions are inspired by some parallels between
intentional mental states and dispositions. Suppose Johnny believes that Santa brings him
presents, lives at the North Pole, has red cheeks, etc. ere is a certain sense in which
these beliefs of Johnny’s are directed at Santa. Since Santa doesn’t exist, there is also a
certain sense in which these beliefs are directed at something that doesn’t exist. And so
it is for intentional mental states in general: there is a certain sense in which they are
directed at something, and they can be directed at something that doesn’t exist.⁴⁴ But dis-
positions have these two features as well: there is a certain sense in which a disposition is
directed at its manifestation, and, since a disposition need not manifest, there is a certain
sense in which a disposition can be directed at something that does not exist. So, since
some dispositions are not mental properties, this suggests that intentionality might not be
the mark of the mental. It also suggests that maybe we should try to oﬀer an account of
dispositions in which the directedness of dispositions is explained in terms of the direct-
edness of intentionality. In other words, perhaps we should oﬀer an intentionality-based
account of dispositions.
ere is an obvious objection to this line of thought. e sense in which an intentional
mental state is directed at something is that the mental state is about or represents some-
thing. Johnny’s belief that Santa brings him presents is directed at Santa in the sense that
his belief is about or represents Santa. But dispositions are neither about nor represent
their manifestations. us, the directedness of dispositions cannot be explained in terms
of the directedness of intentionality.⁴⁵
If it weren’t for (TAD), I don’t think this objection would be decisive. A defender of an
⁴³See Place (), Martin and Heil (), and Molnar ().
⁴⁴is observation is famously due to Brentano ().
⁴⁵Bird () argues that other alleged parallels between intentional mental states and the directedness
of dispositions are weak at best.
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intentionality-based account of dispositions could respond by saying that the numerous
failed aempts to provide a satisfactory conditional analysis of dispositions provide some
motivation for looking in a diﬀerent direction. Perhaps the parallel between the directed-
ness of intentional mental states and the directedness of dispositions isn’t perfect. But the
parallel doesn’t have to be perfect for us to grasp a more general notion of intentionality,
one in which there is both mental intentionality and physical intentionality.
(TAD) undermines this response. It provides an explanation of the directedness of dis-
positions, and it is not motivated by appealing to any parallel between intentional mental
states and dispositions. As illustrated by the above detour, part of the motivation for
(TAD) is that there is some is some parallel between events in progress and dispositions.
But this seems to be correct. Contrast the following:
(i) the sense in which an event in progress of Steve driving to Boston is directed at its
culmination,
(ii) the sense in which a vase’s disposition to break when struck is directed at its man-
ifestation.
(iii) the sense in which Johnny’s belief that Santa has red checks is is directed at Santa.
It strikes me that (i) and (ii) are very similar but (iii) is very diﬀerent. So, I think it is safe to
appeal to a parallel between events in progress and dispositions as part of the motivation
for (TAD). In any case, (TAD) oﬀers an explanation of the directedness of dispositions that
does not require postulating a more general notion of intentionality. us, the burden is
on the second camp to show that this explanation is inadequate but an explanation that
rests on (ii) and (iii) being similar in some way is adequate. I’m skeptical.
e second camp might respond by claiming that my teleological notion of directed-
ness falls under the general notion of intentionality. If this can be shown, then I join the
second camp.
. Taking stock
Let’s take stock. e ﬁrst camp needs to provide a satisfactory conditional analysis that is
incompatible with (TAD) or they need to provide a satisfactory conditional analysis and
show that it is impossible for a disposition to be fundamental property. e second camp
needs to provide a convincing argument that a teleological explanation of the directed-
ness of dispositions is inadequate but an explanation that appeals to similarities between
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intentional mental states and dispositions is adequate. I’ve argued that neither camp has
provided what it needs to provide.
I conclude we have good reason to favor (TAD) over the competition.
 Concluding remark
I’ve argued that whenever something has a disposition, something is in a state with a
telos. Along the way, I’ve also sketched an argument for the claim that whenever there
is an event in progress, there is an event with a telos. Absent a strong argument that
nothing has any disposition at any time and that nothing is ever happening at any time,
I take it that there is thus good reason to think that Bacon was terribly mistaken about
teleology. Inquiry into ﬁnal causes is far from sterile. On the contrary, it reveals the
nature of dispositions and events in progress. Or so I’ve argued.⁴⁶
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Appendix
Manley andWasserman () argue that a problemwith competing conditional analyses
is that they cannot account for the fact that dispositions come in degrees. Simplifying
somewhat, their argument runs as follows. Take the adjectives ‘fragile’, ‘sturdy’, and
‘soluble’. ese adjectives denote dispositions. And these adjectives are clearly gradable
adjectives. Witness: ‘is vase is more fragile than that one’, ‘e concrete block is very
sturdy’, ‘How soluble is salt?’. So, since gradable adjectives denote gradable properties, it
follows that some dispositions are gradable properties. us, some dispositions come in
⁴⁶If we conjoin (TAD) with a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature, we also have an
argument that teleology reveals something about the laws of nature. According to a dispositional essentialist
account of the laws of nature, the laws, or at least some of the laws, are grounded in those dispositions that
are fundamental properties. (See Ellis  and Bird .) Combining this account of laws with (TAD), it
follows that at least some of the laws of nature are grounded in teleological properties. at is, it follows
that at least some of the laws are teleological laws.
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degrees. e problem, then, for conditional analyses like (SCA) and (LCA) is that while
dispositions come in degrees, conditionals do not. (PROP), however, doesn’t have this
problem because proportions come in degrees.
One problem with this argument is that on what is perhaps the standard semantics for
gradable adjectives, such adjectives do not denote properties of individuals. Rather, they
denote measure functions: functions from individuals to degrees on a scale. (See Kennedy
.) For example, ‘tall’ is taken to denote a function from individuals to degrees on a
scale of height and ‘cold’ is taken to denote a function from individuals to degrees on a
scale of temperature. Comparative morphemes, then, are taken to establish an ordering
relation between degrees on the relevant scale. Bypassing the compositional details, the
upshot is that ‘x is taller than y’ is true just in case x’s degree of height is greater than
y’s degree of height. A covert morpheme is postulated for the positive form of a gradable
adjective (occurrences in clauses without any overt degree morphology like ‘x is G’ where
‘G’ is a gradable adjective). Semantically, this covert morpheme takes a measure function
and returns a context sensitive function from individuals to truth values. Relative to a
context, this function takes an individual and returns the value True just in case the the
value of the measure function applied to the individual is a degree on the relevant scale
that “stands out” in the context. Bypassing the compositional details, the upshot is that
‘x is tall’ is true relative to a context c just in case x’s degree of height stands out in c.
Let’s go back to the gradable adjective ‘fragile’. Under the above semantics for gradable
adjectives, ‘fragile’ does not denote a disposition. It denotes a measure function from
individuals to degrees on a scale. Butwhat is this scalemeasuring? Assuming that fragility
has something to do with breaking and striking, it is probably further safe to assume that
the scale is measuring the degree to which something is disposed to break when struck.
Suppose the degrees on this scale are dispositions. At the boom of the scale are things
that are disposed to withstand any damage when struck. Going up, we ﬁnd things that are
disposed to crack a lile when struck. Going further up, we ﬁnds things that are disposed
to shaer when struck. So, x is more fragile than y just in case x’s position on this scale is
higher than y’s position on this scale. Likewise, ‘x is fragile’ is true relative to a context c
just in case x0s position on this scale stands out in c. e defender of (SCA) can now claim
that the degrees of the scale (i.e., the dispositions) correspond to certain counterfactual
properties. Anything at the boomof the scale is such that it wouldwithstand any damage
if struck. Going further up, we ﬁnd things that would crack a lile if stuck. Further up
yet, we ﬁnd things that would shaer if struck. Generalizing, the degrees on the scale can
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be mapped onto certain counterfactual properties, and so (SCA) has no problems with the
fact that ‘fragile’ is a gradable adjective.
On the other hand, it could be that the degrees on the scale are dispositions, but to-
wards the top of the scale are things that are disposed to break when struck ever so lightly.
Going down are things disposed to break when struck not ever so lightly but with a mod-
erate amount of force. Going further down are things disposed to break when stuck not
with a moderate amount of force but with a great deal of force. At the boom, we ﬁnd the
unbreakable: things that disposed to withstand any striking. So, x is more fragile than y
just in case x position on this other scale is higher than y’s position on this other scale.
Likewise, ‘x is fragile’ is true relative to a context c just in case x0s position on this other
scale stands out in c. And, once again, the defender of (SCA) can now claim that these
degrees on this other scale correspond to certain counterfactual properties.
One can devise other scales, but so long as the degrees on this scale are dispositions,
the defender of (SCA) will not have a problem. Similar remarks apply to any account of
dispositions and any gradable adjective that is usually taken by philosophers to denote a
disposition. So, Manley and Wasseman’s objection has no force against (TAD).
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